In this paper, we present the overflow problem of a network coding storage system (NCSS) when the encoding parameters and the storage parameters are mismatched. The overflow problem of the NCSS occurs because the network-coded encryption yields extended coded data, resulting in high storage and processing overhead. To avoid the overflow problem, we propose an overflow-avoidance NCSS scheme that takes account of security and storage requirements in both encoding and storage procedures. We provide the analytical results of the maximum allowable stored encoded data under the perfect secrecy criterion. The design guidelines to achieve high coding efficiency with the lowest storage cost are also presented.
INTRODUCTION
N ETWORK coding is attractive for its capability of achieving the unconditional security. In principle, network coding simply mixes data from different network nodes based on the well-designed linear combination rules. As long as partial network-coded data are protected, an eavesdropper cannot decode the entire plaintext even with infinite computing power and time [1] . Another advantage of network coding is that no bandwidth expansion occurs compared to the cryptographic approaches.
In recent years, network coding is introduced to enhance the security of cloud storage in which customers outsource their data to multiple clouds [2] . Though offering many advantages, cloud storage inevitably poses security threats on the outsourced data. In [3] , the problem of checking the integrity of network coded data in a secure cloud storage system was investigated. In [4] , it was shown that network coding can be used to prevent eavesdropping in distributed cloud storage. However, from the aspect of implementation, the performance issues of network coding for secure cloud storage remains open. This motivates us to explore how to practically and cost-effectively store coded data in multiple clouds. Fig. 1 illustrates a secure cloud storage scenario considered in this paper. A network coding storage system consists of the following three procedures: splitting, encoding, and distributing. In this figure, an original file is split into smaller chunks of symbols. These symbols are encoded by Vandermonde matrix [5] and then stored to different cloud databases. With network coding protection, a legitimate user can recover the entire original file, but an eavesdropper in only one cloud database cannot decode the original symbols [4] .
When encoding parameters (such as the size of encoding matrix) are not jointly designed with the storage parameters (such as the storage size per node), a secure network coding storage system may encounter the following issue. The stored coded data size in the cloud database can be longer than the original data size. This issue occurs when network coded data are represented in the format of digits and is called the overflow problem in this paper. It is notable that the above works [2] , [3] , [4] on secure cloud storage will face the overflow problem. Table 1 is an illustrative example of the overflow problem in the case of binary digits. A is the network encoding matrix in Galois field GF(2 3 ) constructed with the primitive polynomial P ðxÞ ¼ x 3 þ x þ 1, b i 's are the original data, and c i 's are the network-coded data, where i ¼ 1; 2; 3. Assume that c 1 ð0Þ and c 3 ð101Þ are stored in the first database and c 2 ð11Þ is stored in the second database. In this example, the bit length of c i is larger than that of b i . We consider that the number of bits required to represent a single codeword (i.e., code length) is fixed for all the coded data stored in the same database. In this case, the code length used in a cloud database is the maximum bit length of the stored networkcoded data. Hence, it requires three bits code length to store c 1 and c 3 and two bits code length to store c 2 in the respective cloud databases. In principle, network coding should not incur more bandwidth, i.e., encoded bit length should be equal to the plaintext bit length. In this example, the bit length of b is three, while the bit length of c is extended to six. We call it the overflow problem in this paper.
In overflow problem, bandwidth expansion and redundant computation occur if the data representation formats of the original data and the coded data are mismatched. This is mainly because the existing encoding process (e.g., splitting the original data) does not consider i) how to place the coded data among multiple clouds and ii) the risk of being decoded by the eavesdropper. Clearly, the extended coded data would waste storage space and degrade coding efficiency.
To solve this overflow problem, we develop a systematic design method to calculate the appropriate parameters of a network-coded cloud storage system, such as the size of encoding matrix. The key idea of the NCSS scheme is to take dynamic-length alphabet representation of network coded data. The original data are regrouped before the encoding process. A complete encoding procedures and data distribution scheme are jointly designed for secure cloud storage. Our contributions are described as follows.
Formulate the overflow problem of a network-coded cloud storage system. To our best knowledge, the overflow problem for a network coding storage system has not been investigated in the literature yet. Propose an overflow-avoidance network coding based secure storage (NCSS) scheme. Analyze the minimum storage cost subject to different security levels and derive the upper bound of the amount of encoded data that can be stored in cloud databases to achieve perfect secrecy. Provide the design guidelines for the appropriate size of the encoding matrix so that the network coding process can be accelerated. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a literature survey on the related works of network coding storage systems. In Section 3, the overflow problem of a network-coded cloud storage system is formulated. In Section 4, we analyze the overflow problem. We present the overflow-avoidance NCSS scheme in Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7, we analyze the security and storage performances of the proposed scheme, respectively. Section 8 shows the experimental results. Finally, we give our concluding remarks in Section 9.
RELATED WORK
Network coding is a generalized store-and-forward network routing principle. Messages from different source nodes are combined and regenerated at the intermediate nodes according to algebraic encoding. In addition to throughput enhancement [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] and data robustness [10] , the other advantages of network coding are reliability and security.
Network Coding for Data Recovery
Network coding can make data recovery process more efficiently, especially in the distributed storage systems. In contrast to erasure coding [11] , the repaired data fragments in network coding are mixed in the intermediate nodes.
Hence, network coding can recover data with smaller amount of information communicated during a repair process. As proved by [12] , the data recovery problem of distributed storage systems can be translated to the routing problem of multicasting networks. A new class of storage codes based on network coding namely Regenerating Code was proposed in [12] . For coding complexity reduction, the authors of [13] proposed a low-complexity regenerating code using a new form of coding matrix with a small field size.
As in the distributed storage systems, recent studies [14] , [15] , [16] demonstrated the feasibility of storing coded data to multiple clouds even with multiple node failures. The authors of [14] applied network coding to optimize the reliability performance of frequently accessed data in cloud storage systems. To simplify the repair procedures, network coding with network structure based on the general erasure codes was shown to reduce the repair traffic significantly [15] . A new type of regenerating code that can reconstruct coded data from multiple failures in batches rather than separately was proposed in [16] .
Network Coding for Data Security
Network coding can prevent data from being eavesdropped in a wiretap network where a wiretapper can access any one of subsets of wiretap channels [17] . The goal of a secure network coding scheme for a wiretap network is to ensure a wiretapper obtains no information about the original message, while all the legitimate receivers can decode the message. A network coding system was built so that a wiretapper cannot obtain any information [18] . The construction of a secure linear network code for a wiretap network was presented in [19] .
For network-coded distributed storage systems, the secrecy capacity was used to quantify the secure storage capacity [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] . The secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum amount of data that can be securely stored under the perfect secrecy condition. Perfect secrecy means that the eavesdropper cannot obtain any information of source data. In other words, perfect secrecy requires that the entropy of the plaintext is equal to the conditional entropy of the plaintext given the eavesdropped data. A network coding scheme for approaching the storage upper bound under the perfect secrecy was proposed in [20] . Different secure regenerating codes to achieve perfect secrecy against eavesdropping were reported in [21] , [22] , [23] . For secure storage over multiple clouds, the authors of [4] proposed a security protection scheme to prevent eavesdroppers from decoding any symbol. In [24] , a link eavesdropping problem was investigated in a network-coded cloud storage system in which transmission links between the local datacenter and its remote backup site are eavesdropped. In the considered link eavesdropping problem, the security level is defined as the probability that coded data cannot be decoded correctly. In addition to eavesdropping attacks, some recent works [25] , [26] investigated how to detect when the coded data are modified.
Performance Issue of Network Coding
Two major challenges for designing a practical network coding system include i) the computational cost of encoding and decoding and ii) the storage cost of coded data. The destination node can decode the received packet if and only if the coefficient matrix of the packet is full rank. To decrease the probability of receiving linearly dependent packets, the coding parameters including the field size and the encoding matrix size are assumed to be large. However, larger value of coding parameters will lead to higher computational cost [27] . In addition, to decode a received codeword, the destination node requires the coding vector which results in additional packet overhead. Especially, the computation and storage costs would be severe for a huge number of input packets [28] .
To overcome the above issues, it is proposed to separate a large file into a number of small chunks to which the network coding is applied [29] . This design is also used in the network coding storage system in which the information bits are divided into groups (chunks) before encoding. However, it is still an open issue to jointly optimize the design of chunked network codes and chunk transmission scheme [30] .
Objective of This Paper
In this paper, we focus on the performance issue of network coding when applying network coding in multiple untrusted clouds. The objective of this work is to develop a systematic design methodology of a network-coded cloud storage system. Similar methodology for the joint coding and placement problem can be found in [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] . The authors of [31] considered the relations among the clouds during the encoding process and proposed an encoding-aware data placement scheme to achieve throughput gains of encoding operations. An adaptive network coding storage scheme was proposed in [32] . The encoding strategy is adjusted according to the transmission conditions (e.g., packet loss rate). However, the storage cost of the coded data is not considered. In [33] , the authors proposed to encode chunks using binary addition and bitwise cyclic shift in order to reduce encoding complexity. It is shown that the optimal tradeoff between storage capacity and repair bandwidth can be achieved. The most relevant one to our work is [34] . It investigated how to store data reliably in multiple clouds and provided the optimal amount of data to be stored in the clouds. The storage cost is shown to be highly affected by the potential number of colluding cloud databases. However, the number of colluding cloud databases in [34] is assumed to be known, which is impractical in many applications. Compared with these previous works, our proposed methodology has the following unique features.
We investigate the overflow problem in chunked network coding. Through analyses, we show that the number of bits to represent a symbol is an important factor related to the overflow problem. Different from the previous work [33] considering binary operation, we extend the performance characterization of chunked network codes using a general finite field. The encoding process and the data placement are jointly designed in the proposed network coding framework in consideration of the storage cost as well as security requirements. Extending [34] , we consider a probabilistic security model of a network-coded cloud storage system. Our results provide a comprehensive understanding for finding the best combination of coding and storage parameters.
SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM SETUP
Now we discuss the coding scheme and define the overflow problem.
System Model for NCSS
Consider the original base-d data vector b ¼ ðb 1 ; . . . ; b n Þ T , where elements b i are independent discrete uniformly distributed integers over 0; . . . ; d À 1 f g . To securely store b to multiple cloud databases, network coding scheme that encodes symbols by linear transformation is considered in this paper [4] .
Let an n Â n Vandermonde matrix A be the encoding matrix, where A i;j Â Ã ¼ ða iÀ1 j Þ and a i are distinct nonzero elements over a finite field F q for q ¼ 2 k > n. Then a cloud user encodes data c ¼ ðc 1 ; . . . ; c n Þ T ¼ Ab and splits the encoded data into p segments. It is assumed that the cloud user can arbitrarily store any piece of the encoded data to any cloud database. Letc i ði ¼ 1; . . . ; pÞ be the encoded data vector stored in the ith cloud database. A legitimate user can collectc i from the cloud databases and obtain the original data by performing A À1 c.
We consider the security threat from an eavesdropper having infinite computing power and the knowledge of encoding matrix, but access less than half of the cloud databases [4] . The objective of the eavesdropper is to guess the original data. The considered cloud storage system can support different security levels in different databases [35] . Define P e i as the probability that the ith cloud database is compromised. Also, the cloud user specifies a security requirement P u , which represents the maximum probability that an eavesdropper can guess the original data. Next, we will show the overflow problem when distributing encoded symbols to multiple cloud databases.
Overflow Problem
Although network coding scheme can prevent eavesdroppers from obtaining the information of the original data [1] , the length of encoded data in digital format may become larger than the length of the original data. This phenomenon is called overflow in this paper and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Strictly Non-overflow). Let l d ðaÞ be the number of digits that represents a in base d. A piece of encoded data c ¼ ðc 1 ; . . . ; c n Þ T is strictly non-overflow if and only if l d ðc i Þ l d ðb i Þ for each i. Note that the length of the encoded data is equal to that of the plaintext for a strictly non-overflow encoding process.
for 1 i p.
Assume the encoded data are stored in cloud databases randomly. The increasing cost of storage or computation resources can be measured by the extension degree a ¼ l d ðc i Þ l d ðb i Þ . Table 2 shows an example for the two different overflow cases with d ¼ 2 and p ¼ 2. The extension degree is bounded by 3 in case 2, compared to the strictly non-overflow case 1. Note that all the coding operations in the example are performed in Galois field GF(2 3 ), constructed with the primitive polynomial P ðxÞ ¼ x 3 þ x þ 1. Table 3 summarizes the notations used in this paper.
OVERFLOW-AVOIDANCE NCSS SYSTEM

Overflow Analysis
Now we analyze the conditions that cause the overflow problem of a network-coded cloud storage system. Then we show how the overflow problem can be avoided by selecting the proper data length in encoding process. We investigate the conditions of distributing coded data for achieving various security levels. Based on the above analysis, we describe the system design methods of the NCSS scheme.
The encoding parameters in NCSS is related to the overflow problem. To avoid the overflow problem, the encoding parameters can be designed according to the following Theorems. Theorem 1. Let s i be the number of digits in the base-d plaintext b i and 2 k be the Galois field size of encoding matrix A. Then, the NCSS system is strictly non-overflow if s
First, we assume that s i < k log 2 d . Then, we have
Because the coding process deals with integers, we have s i log d ð2 k À 1Þ. Since c i is distributed over 0; . . . ; f 2 k À 1g, the maximum number of digits used to represent an encoded element is l d ðc i Þ max ¼ log d ð2 k À 1Þ. Furthermore, the number of digits in b i can be represented as l d ðb i Þ. Thus, we have
As a result, the length of encoded data can be larger than the length of the original data, and the overflow problem occurs.
Second, we assume that s i > k log 2 d . We take exponentiation with base d on both sides and we have d s i > d log d 2 k ¼ 2 k 
t u Theorems 1 and 2 provide the criteria of selecting the length of the plaintext. Next, we discuss the relation between the security requirement and the amount of encoded stored data.
Theorem 3. The NCSS system satisfies the security require-
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider an eavesdropper that can access only one of the two cloud databases. Thus, the probability that an eavesdropper can guess the original data (denoted by P g ) is the product of the intrusion probability of the cloud database and the probability of guessing the remaining encoded digits. It follows that 
Proposed Scheme
Now we present our proposed overflow-avoidance NCSS scheme with the required security level P u . Our proposed scheme is executed in three steps. First, a dynamic-length alphabet representation of network-coded data is adopted based on Theorems 1 and 2. Second, the original data are preprocessed and regrouped. Third, the regrouped data are encoded and distributed to the distributedly located cloud databases. Fig. 2 shows the system flow of the proposed overflowavoidance NCSS scheme. Assume that a cloud user wants to store a single-digit data array b ¼ ðb 1 ; . . . ; b m Þ T with base d to the p cloud databases. We first choose a power k for the field characteristics according to the following condition:
The field size must be larger than the maximal value of the data array element d À 1. Otherwise, some data elements cannot be represented in the field. After that, a proper length of data elements s i can be decided according to Theorems 1 and 2. This is called dynamic length alphabet representation. We then regroup b to b 0 ¼ ðb 1 . . . b s 1 ; b s 1 þ1 . . . b s 1 þs 2 ; . . . ; bŝ rÀ1 þ1 . . . bŝ r Þ based on the value of s i , whereŝ r ¼ D P r i¼1 s i . Next, we generate an n Â n encoding matrix A with the following condition:
and n r:
Since matrix A is constructed from n distinct elements over the Galois field, we have n < 2 k . In addition, the matrix multiplication cannot be operated if the size of encoding matrix is larger than the size of regrouped data array. We then encode b 0 with A and obtain the encoded data array c ¼ ðc 1 ; . . . ; c n Þ T . Finally, c can be regrouped toc by Theorem 3, which specifies the maximum amount of encoded data that can be stored in a cloud database according to user's security requirement. Finally, the elements ofc are distributed to the corresponding p cloud databases. Table 4 shows an example of the proposed overflowavoidance NCSS scheme in the strictly non-overflow case. Assume that the original data are b ¼ 0; 0; 1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 1 ð Þ and the encoded data are stored to two cloud databases with P e 1 ¼ 0:5, P e 2 ¼ 0:25, and P u ¼ 1 64 . According to Theorem 1, we have s ¼ 3. Hence, the original data are regrouped to 001; 011; 101 ð Þ in the dynamic length alphabet representation process. The resulting coded data is 111; 011; 001 ð Þ . Next, from Theorem 3, we can calculate the maximal numbers of digits that can be stored in the first and the second cloud database are four and five, respectively. As a result, the coded data stored in the first and the second cloud database are 1110 and 11001, respectively.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the proposed overflowavoidance NCSS scheme in terms of security level and storage cost. First, we discuss the issue of enhancing security level from a system design aspect. Then, we derive the upper bound on data size that can be stored in the cloud with unconditional security.
To begin with, from (4) we know that the lower bound of the security requirement P u is
Since l d ðc t Þ is proportional to the size of Galois field, a larger encoding matrix size n and a large value of power k of the field characteristics can result in higher security levels. However, enlarging encoding parameters causes higher coding complexity. Next, we show that the security level can be enhanced to unconditional security level by storing a certain amount of encoded data in the local machine.
In the considered NCSS with eavesdropper, unconditional security is equivalent to perfect secrecy, which means that the eavesdropper can get no information from the original message [36] .
Definition 3 (Perfect Secrecy Criterion [37] ). Denote S as the random variable associated with the secret data fragments and E as the random variable associated with the encoded fragments observed by the eavesdropper. The perfect secrecy requires HðSjEÞ ¼ HðSÞ;
where H(X) represents the entropy of a random variable X.
In the worst case, an eavesdropper can access the encoded data of all the cloud databases. The following theorem can be applied to specify the maximal amount of encoded data fragments that can be stored in the cloud, while keeping the rest of data in a local machine to ensure perfect secrecy.
Theorem 4. Assume that w-digit secret information is encoded with (n À w)-digit data b. For both strictly non-overflow and a-bounded non-overflow schemes, a cloud user can store at most P n j¼1 l d ðc j Þ À w digits of encoded data to the cloud under the perfect secrecy criterion.
Proof. Let e ðhÞ represent a subset containing any h components of vector e. We denote e i:j as the subvector formed from the ith to the jth position of vector e. The set of rows from the ith to the jth position of matrix D is represented as D i:j . In addition, b i are independent random variables uniformly distributed over F q with entropy Hðb i Þ ¼ HðbÞ.
For simplicity, without loss of generality, assume that t contiguous components of the encoded data c pþ1:pþt are stored to the clouds. Then we can obtain 
In the above equations, (9) holds because of the perfect secrecy criterion and due to the fact that the secret information can be reconstructed if the entire codewords are given. In (10), we have Hðc pþ1:pþt jb ðwÞ Þ À Hðcjb ðwÞ Þ 0 since Hðcjb ðwÞ Þ À Hðc pþ1:pþt jb ðwÞ Þ ¼ Hðc pþtþ1:n jb ðwÞ ; c pþ1:pþt Þ:
Since b i are i.i.d random variables, it follows that Hðb w ð Þ Þ ¼ H b qð1Þ ; b qð2Þ ; . . . ; b qðwÞ À Á ¼ wHðbÞ; (11) where qðjÞ is the jth element of a random integer sequence ranged from 1 to n. Because the encoded data vector c contains the entire information of b at most, we can obtain
HðcÞ nHðbÞ:
Moreover, an n Â n Vandermonde matrix A is nonsingular [5] . Thus, the eavesdropper can apply Gaussian elimination to obtain the reduced row echelon form of the submatrix S, whose elements are ½S i;j ¼ ½A i;j for p þ 1 i; j p þ t. 
where the other element of M are the same as A. Hence, the eavesdropper have t equations to solve n unknown elements. It implies that Hðc pþ1:pþt Þ ¼ tHðbÞ: (11), (14) and (12) into (10), we obtain tHðbÞ nHðbÞ À wHðbÞ:
The above equation shows that we can store at most the n À w components of encoded data to the clouds under perfect secrecy criterion. For the strictly non-overflow scheme, we have only one digit in each component of encoded data. Thus, we can store at most P n j¼1 l d ðc j Þ À w digits of encoded data to the clouds, while keeping the remaining w digits in the local machines. However, we may have multiple digits in each component of encoded data for a-bounded non-overflow scheme. Let e ðhÞ represent a subset containing any w fragmentary components of vector e. With at least n unknown digits, knowing c ðwÞ cannot help solve b. As a result, it follows that I c ðwÞ ; b ¼ 0:
Note that we still have t equations to solve n unknown elements. That is,
Hðb ðwÞ jc pþ1:pþt ; c ðwÞ Þ ¼ Hðb ðwÞ jc pþ1:pþt Þ:
Finally, we obtain
Consequently, we can select w digits of encoded data from different w components, i.e., select one digit for each component. These w-digit encoded data can be stored in the local machines, while the remaining P n j¼1 l d ðc j Þ À w digits are stored to the clouds. t u
STORAGE ANALYSIS
We here analyze the amount of stored encoded data with the security requirement in terms of the probability that an eavesdropper can obtain the original data. This is because only a certain amount of encoded data fragments are stored in the local machines to enhance the security level, as shown in the previous section. As the required security level increases, the amount of encoded data stored at the local site increases. Let a cloud user keep the length-l encoded data in each encoding operation and store the remaining encoded data to p cloud databases as shown in Fig. 3 . We assume all the cloud databases have the same probability of being compromised (i.e., P e i ¼ P e ) and the security requirement is P u , which specifies the maximum probability that an eavesdropper can guess the original message. In addition to the encoded data, the encoding matrix is stored at the local site.
Let m and a be the length of the original message and the number of encoding operations, respectively. In addition to the encoded data, the user needs to keep the encoding matrix for decoding. In case of strictly non-overflow storage, the storage cost at the local site is the function of encoding matrix size n and the amount of stored encoded data l. As a result, the storage space used to store the encoded data and the encoding matrix at the local site is fðn; lÞ ¼ n 2 s þ al:
Subject to the security requirement P u , the storage cost minimization problem can be expressed as min fðn; lÞ (20a) s.t. ð1 À P e Þ p d Àal 4 P u (20b)
where s is defined in Theorem 1. An eavesdropper can guess the original message only if he/she can intrude all the cloud databases and guess the encoded data in the local machine. It is observed that the optimization problem is nonconvex even if we relax the noncovex constraints n; l 2 Z þ . The complete algorithm for solving this optimization problem is given in Appendix. Fig. 4 shows the optimal parameter setting for encoding matrix size n versus the original message length m for d ¼ 2, P e ¼ 0:5, p ¼ 3, and P u ¼ 10 À6 . As the message length increases, the size of the encoding matrix increases. A smaller encoding matrix size is preferred if Galois field size is large. Due to the integer constraints in the optimization problem, the encoding matrix size increases in a step-like function. Fig. 5 shows the storage cost fðn; lÞ versus message length m for d ¼ 2, P e ¼ 0:5, and p ¼ 3. Intuitively, we need more storage for lower P u . However, the storage cost with various P u are the same when m exceeds a certain threshold. This is because the considered system is in the case of lower bound cost (i.e., l ¼ 1). Noteworthily, a larger k can yield a smaller lower bound when m > 1000. In general, k 2 ½8; 16 [38] . For m < 1000, it is suggested that k ¼ 8; otherwise, k ¼ 16.
The amount of stored encoded data l is another important design parameter for the proposed NCSS. In practice, the NCSS system with large l requires a large memory to store all the coding coefficients. Fig. 6 shows the required l under different P u . To achieve a higher security requirement, the user needs to store more encoded data in the local site. In addition, l can be reduced up to 80 percent if a large file is encoded. It is observed that the file size plays a bigger role in determining l compared to the Galois field size.
Noth that we consider a secure network coding system with no redundancy as in [1] , i.e., n input symbols are encoded to n coded symbols, and we need all the n coded symbols to recover the data. As shown in [12] , network coding can achieve optimal storage-bandwidth tradeoff in erasure coded-distributed storage systems. The proposed scheme can be applied to those with redundancy, such as erasure codes [31] and regenerating codes [33] . In these cases, n input symbols are encoded to n þ z coded symbols, where the amount of redundancy z depends on the required reliability level. This can be achieved by using a ðn þ zÞ Â n coding matrix A in the proposed network coding scheme.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Since the encoding process is performed at local machines, processing delay may be the performance bottlenecks. Thus, it is of importance to investigate the impacts of the system design parameters of a secure network coding scheme on its delay performance. To implement the user application and cloud storage, we develop the coding layer and storage layer of NCSS. Each original file is associated with the metadata which includes the coding information (e.g., encoding coefficients). The goal of our experiments is to explore the encoding performance of the proposed NCSS in terms of the file encoding time and the storage cost. Our experiments are conducted on a commodity computer with an Intel Core i5 processor running at 2.4 GHz, 8 GB of RAM, and a 5,400 RPM Hitachi 500 GB Serial ATA drive with an 8 MB buffer. Table 5 shows the parameters setting for experiments. Note that, in our setting, different cloud databases are geographically separated. Hence, the presented results are equivalent to those with p clouds, each having numerous databases.
We begin by estimating the cost of basic field operation. Fig. 7 shows the multiplication processing time of the network coding storage system with different sizes of Galois field. Although the complexity for the network coding is Oðn 2 Þ modular multiplication, we find that the field size only affects the processing time slightly, which supports our design methodology of selecting k. Specifically, it indicates that the security level can be enhanced significantly by selecting an appropriate value of k at a small computational cost.
To evaluate the computational efficiency of the proposed NCSS scheme, we conduct an encoding test using the proposed network coding scheme. Fig. 8 shows the processing time between the strictly non-overflow and the a-bounded non-overflow schemes for 2 MB file with p ¼ 2, where a ¼ 5. The processing time is longer for a smaller n or k since the numbers of encoding times increase. As a result, the system spends more time in I/O operations and fetching data between the kernel and user [10] . Compared to the strictly non-overflow scheme, the a-bounded non-overflow scheme requires more computation cost. The a-bounded non-overflow scheme costs more than 11 times and 22 times of the processing time than that of the strictly non-overflow scheme when k ¼ 16 and 8, respectively. Finally, the best performance is achieved when n > 100 for both nonoverflow schemes. Because increasing n results in a larger cost than increasing k, we suggest adjusting k to meet the security requirements under the condition n ¼ 100. Fig. 9 compares the processing time of the strictly nonoverflow and the a-bounded non-overflow schemes versus the power of Galois field characteristic k. In the figure, the strictly non-overflow scheme is preferable to the a-bounded non-overflow scheme. Noteworthily, k negligibly affects the processing time of the strictly non-overflow scheme, but do impact the processing time of the a-bounded non-overflow scheme.
We note that it is shown in [33] that k ¼ 8 is preferred from the viewpoint of low computational cost in the case of m ¼ 4 KB with no eavesdropper. This is consistent to our observation from Figs. 4 and 8 . On the other hand, if storage cost is the primary concern, k ¼ 16 is recommended based on our results.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the overflow problem in a network coding cloud storage system. The overflow problem causes more storage spaces and increases encoding time. We developed the overflow-avoidance network coding based secure storage scheme. A systematic approach for the optimal encoding and storage parameters was provided to solve the overflow problem and minimize the storage cost. Furthermore, we derived an analytical upper bound on the maximal allowable stored data in the cloud nodes under perfect secrecy criterion. We demonstrated that encoding efficiency in terms of processing time can be improved by jointly designing the encoding and the storage system parameters. More importantly, we suggested the design guidelines for NCSS to optimize the performance tradeoff among security requirement, storage cost per node, and encoding processing time. This work can be extended to incorporate user budgets and file recovery, which is an interesting topic to study further in the future.
APPENDIX
Here we first show that the original storage cost minimization (20) is not convex even when the integer constraint is relaxed. Then we give the algorithm for solving the optimization problem by minimizing over separated variables. Proof. We consider the case of strictly non-overflow scheme. Substituting s i ¼ s ¼ k log 2 d into (20) , the original storage cost minimization is equivalent to min fðn; lÞ ¼ k log 2 d n 2 þ mlog 2 d k n À1 l (21a) s.t. À k mlog 2 d log d P u ð1 À P c Þ p n 4 l 4 n (21b) 2 4 n 4 2 k (21c) n; l 2 Z þ :
Then we prove Theorem 5 by showing that the Hessian matrix of the objective function is not positive semidefinite. The Hessian matrix of fðn; lÞ is Fig. 8 . Comparison of processing time between the strictly non-overflow and the a-bounded non-overflow schemes versus matrix size n with p ¼ 2. Fig. 9 . Comparison of processing time between the strictly non-overflow and the a-bounded non-overflow schemes versus power of Galois field characteristic k with p ¼ 2.
where a ¼ k log 2 d > 0 and b ¼ mlog 2 d k > 0. Then, we solve the characteristic equation detðHðfÞ À IÞ ¼ 2 À ð2a þ 2bln À3 Þ À b 2 n À4 ¼ 0:
We can obtain
Since the eigenvalues of HðfÞ is not all positive, HðfÞ is not positive semidefinite. Thus f is not convex. Since min l2A fðn; lÞ is a linear function with one variable in Z 1 þþ for fixed n and the coefficient is positive, we obtain
As a result, we can solve the optimization problem iteratively as:
Step 0: Initiate C ¼ ; and B ¼ fxjx 2 Z þ ; 2 4 x < 2 k g.
Step 1: Select n 2 B and set l ¼ d Ànk mlog 2 d log d
Pu ð1ÀPcÞ pe.
Step 2: Calculate c ¼ fðn; lÞ.
Step 3: Set C ¼ C [ fcg and B ¼ B À fng.
Step 4: Iterate 1 to 4 until B ¼ ;.
Step 5: Obtain f Ã ðn; lÞ ¼ minfCg.
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